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Birch et al (2020) propose an Unlimited Associative Model (UAL) as a transition marker 
for the appearance of consciousness in the animal kingdom. Their approach is explicitly 
modeled on the way in which origin-of-life science proceeds. Their strategy is to find a 
list of features that are jointly sufficient for the presence of conscious experience, and 
then to look for some conditions that would be required in order for the features on that 
list to occur. They propose that the following features are jointly sufficient for conscious 
experience:  
 
First, there is global accessibility and broadcast: a minimal global workspace (in 
the sense of Dehaene 2014) where information from perception, memory and 
evaluative systems is integrated and broadcast back to these and other systems. 
Second, there is binding/unification and differentiation: objects (e.g. a blue box) 
are perceived, not just fragmented features (boxness and blueness). Third, there 
is selective attention and exclusion: there are mechanisms for making some 
stimuli more salient than others. Fourth, there is intentionality: the capacity to 
represent the world and one’s own body. Fifth, there is integration of information 
over time, not just at a single time. Sixth, there is an evaluative system. Seventh, 
there is agency and embodiment. Eighth, and finally, there is registration of a 
self/other distinction. 
 
Birch et al argue that UAL can serve as a marker indicating the presence of these 
features, so that questions about the origin of consciousness can be translated into 
questions about the origin of UAL.  But there are other accounts of the origin of 
consciousness, such as higher-order theory (e.g., LeDoux 2019; Rosenthal 2005, chs. 
7, 10; and others), which Birch et al simply ignore. 
 
And unfortunately, Birch et al also offer no argument that their proposed features do 
jointly suffice for the presence of conscious experience, beyond saying that many 
theorists will accept it.  That’s possible.  The list is in effect a compilation of features 
advanced by various theories as being essential to consciousness; so many theorists 
will find something to like.  But without evaluating the claims those different theories 
make about their favorite feature, the list remains unconvincing. 
 
Birch et al are clear that by sufficiency they mean to rule out the relevance of 
philosophical zombies -i.e., physical duplicates that lack consciousness.  But they give 
no reason to think that the joint realization of all of their features could not occur without 
any conscious experience at all.   And there are reasons, considered below, to think that 
the features they list either have no connection with consciousness or at most occur 
only in connection with somewhat special types of conscious experience. 
 
Birch et. al. see their model as incompatible with higher-order-thought (HOT) theories of 
consciousness, on which a state is conscious if one is in some suitable way aware of 
that state.  They see higher-order (HO) awareness as an “extra ingredient”.  But since 
Birch et al go on to say that “[t]his is not the place for a detailed discussion of HOT 
theories,” they don’t address why they take HO awareness to be an extra ingredient or 
why HOT theorists are convinced that it’s needed.   
 
So a few words about that.  It’s central to any understanding of what it is for a 
psychological state to be conscious that we know how conscious mental states differ 
from subliminal psychological states that occur without being conscious.  When one 
perceives something subliminally, one is wholly unaware of perceiving that thing, and 
will sincerely deny doing so.  It follows that if a state does occur consciously, one is in 
some suitable way aware of that state. 
 
This HO awareness is central to our commonsense understanding of what it is for a 
psychological state to be conscious.  And it is central also to all experimental work on 
consciousness; researchers rely on distinguishing conscious states from subliminal and 
other unconscious states by whether subjects report being in the state in question.  And 
a verbal report is an indication that the subject is aware of the state; without such 
awareness, the subject would be unable to report.  Indeed, Birch et al in effect 
recognize this when they write that “it is only in humans that we can independently 
verify, through verbal report, that a stimulus was consciously experienced.”  
 
So the HO awareness that HOT theory posits as accompanying every conscious state 
is by no means an extra ingredient.  And HO theorists have no difficulty describing why 
that posit is crucial.  The HO awareness is needed to explain how conscious states 
differ from psychological states that aren’t conscious (Brown, Lau, and LeDoux 2019; 
Lau and Rosenthal 2011; Rosenthal 2000).   
 
Birch et al write “that the neural signatures of [conscious] experience, whatever they 
turn out to be, will also be correlated with UAL.”  Perhaps.  But it’s not enough to look 
for the neural signatures of conscious experience if we can’t independently distinguish 
conscious from nonconscious psychological states.  Moreover, we can’t simply assume 
that we know which states are likely to be conscious in nonhuman animals, or indeed 
whether any are.  We need a reliable way to distinguish conscious from unconscious 
psychological states in cases we understand.  At present, those cases are all human.  
Once we get a reliable way to differentiate for humans conscious from unconscious 
psychological states, we can propose various ways that other creatures 'might' be 
conscious.  But we will not have the same degree of certainty that we have from human 
verbal report. For this reason it is currently altogether premature to be talking about 
transition markers. 
 
Let’s turn then to the list of features Birch et al see as jointly sufficient for conscious 
experience.  The first, global accessibility and broadcast (Dehaene 2014), is altogether 
independent of conscious experience.  Peripheral vision is often conscious, but lacks 
global accessibility, and subliminal perceptions can have striking effects on downstream 
psychology processing.  The second, binding, is of course typical of much conscious 
experience, but there is every reason to think it occurs with most unconscious 
perceiving as well (e.g. binding of motion and contrast are part of the perception of a 
moving visual object but until those features are bound to object memory a conscious 
perception of what the moving object is will not occur). As for their third feature, there is 
now an extensive literature on the occurrence of selective object attention that occurs 
unconsciously (e.g., Norman et  al 2013).  Their fourth feature, representing nonmental 
reality, also plainly occurs unconsciously, as does agency (their seventh) and a 
distinction between self and other (which can occur as an immune response, for 
example) (eighth).  And though human conscious experience typically integrates over 
time (fifth) and might often have evaluative implications (sixth), there is no reason to 
think either has any necessary connection with all conscious experience (the 
cerebellum unconsciously integrates motor signals over time, and valuation is present at 
the receptor levels for innately coded stimuli--tissue damage, for example). 
 
Might each of the eight features occur without consciousness but still not jointly?  That’s 
not impossible, but Birch et al give no reason to think it’s so.  And because the features 
have almost nothing to do with one another, apart from apparently being pulled from 
various currently popular theories of consciousness, it’s unlikely that they would work 
together or that their joint occurrence would be sufficient for conscious experience. 
Because of this we expect that the predictions discussed by Birch et al will go 
unconfirmed.  And though the jury is still out there is some work that suggests that this 
may be so (Pessiglione M, et al 2008; Schultz 2013; Balderston et al 2014; Hopkins et 
al 2015) 
 
Given the failure of the list of features to differentiate conscious from unconscious 
psychological states, the need for an appeal to the HO awareness posited by HO 
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